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EXPLOITING POLYHEDRAL SYMMETRIES
IN SOCIAL CHOICE
ACHILL SCHU¨RMANN
Abstract. A large amount of literature in social choice theory deals
with quantifying the probability of certain election outcomes. One way
of computing the probability of a specific voting situation under the
Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption is via counting integral points
in polyhedra. Here, Ehrhart theory can help, but unfortunately the
dimension and complexity of the involved polyhedra grows rapidly with
the number of candidates. However, if we exploit available polyhedral
symmetries, some computations become possible that previously were
infeasible. We show this in three well known examples: Condorcet’s
paradox, Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting and in Plurality voting
vs Plurality Runoff.
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1. Introduction
In social choice theory, a vast amount of literature deals with quantifying
the probability of certain election outcomes. This is in particular the case
for so-called “voting paradoxes” that are known to be unavoidable since the
famous Impossibility Theorem of Arrow [Arr51] (see [TP08] for a popular
exposition). Under the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption,
the probability for such an event can be computed by counting integral so-
lutions to a system of linear inequalities, associated to the specific voting
event of interest (see for example [GL11]). There exists a rich mathematical
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theory going back to works of Ehrhart [Ehr67] in the 1960s that helps to
deal with such problems. We refer to [BR07] and [Bar08] for an introduc-
tion. The connection to Social Choice Theory was recently discovered by
Lepelley et al. [LLS08] and Wilson and Pritchard [WP07]. A few years
earlier a similar theory had been described specifically for the social choice
context by Huang and Chua [HC00] (see also [Geh02]). Based on Barvi-
nok’s algorithm [Bar94] there now exists specialized mathematical software
for performing previously cumbersome or practically impossible computa-
tions. The first available program was LattE, with its newest version LattE
integrale (see [LDK+11a]); an alternative implementation of Barvinok’s
algorithm is available through barvinok (see [VB08]), which is also usable
within the polymake framework (see [GJ00]).
The purpose of this note is to shed some light on the possibilities for
social choice computations that arise through the use of Ehrhart theory
and weighted generalizations of it (see [BBL+10]). We in particular show
how symmetry of linear systems characterizing certain voting events, can
be used to obtain new results. As examples, we consider three well studied
voting situations with four candidates: Condorcet’s paradox, the Condorcet
efficiency of plurality voting and different outcomes in Plurality vs Plurality
Runoff.
In Section 2 we review some linear models for voting events and intro-
duce some of the used notation. In Section 3 we sketch how counting integral
points in polyhedra and Ehrhart’s theory can be used to compute proba-
bilities for voting outcomes. In Section 4 we show how the complexity of
computations can be reduced by using a symmetry reduced, lower dimen-
sional reformulation. We in particular show how to use integration to obtain
exact values for the limiting probability of voting outcomes when the num-
ber of voters tends to infinity. As examples, we obtain previously unknown,
exact values for election events with four candidates.
2. Linear systems describing voting situations
Notation. For the start we look at three candidate elections, as everything
that will follow can best be motivated and explained in smaller examples.
Assume there are n voters, with n ≥ 2, and each of them has a complete
linear (strict) preference order on the three candidates a, b, c. We subdivide
the voters into six groups
(1) (nab, nac, nba, nbc, nca, ncb) ,
according to their six possible preference orders:
abc(nab) acb(nac) bac(nba) bca(nbc) cab(nca) cba(ncb)
For example, there are nab voters that prefer a over b and b over c. We omit
the last preference in the index, as it is determined once we know the others.
This type of indexing will show to be useful when we reduce the number of
variables in Section 4.
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The tuple (1) is referred to as a voting situation. In an election with
(2) n = nab + nac + nba + nbc + nca + ncb
voters, there are
(n+5
5
)
possible voting situations. We make the simplifying
Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption that each of these voting
situations is equally likely to occur.
Condorcet’s Paradox. Maybe the most famous voting paradox goes back
to the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1793). He observed that in an elec-
tion with three or more candidates, it is possible that pairwise comparison
of candidates can lead to an intransitive collective choice. For instance,
candidate a could be preferred over candidate b, b could be preferred over
candidate c and c could be preferred over candidate a. In this case there is
no Condorcet winner, that is, someone who beats every other candidate by
pairwise comparison.
The condition that candidate a is a Condorcet winner can be described
via two linear constraints:
nab + nac + nca > nba + nbc + ncb(3)
nab + nac + nba > nca + nbc + ncb(4)
( a beats b )
( a beats c )
The probability of candidate a being a Condorcet winner in an election
with n voters can be expressed as the quotient
Prob(n) =
card
{
(nab, . . . , ncb) ∈ Z6≥0 satisfying (2), (3), (4)
}
(n+5
5
) .
The denominator is a polynomial of degree 5 in n. It had been observed
by Fishburn and Gehrlein [GF76] (cf. [BB83]) that the numerator shows
a similar behavior: Restricting to even or odd n it can be expressed as a
degree 5 polynomial in n. The leading coefficient of both polynomials is the
same and we approach the same probability for large elections (as n tends
to infinity). This limiting probability is known to be
lim
n→∞
Prob(n) =
5
16
.
Having the probability for candidate a being a Condorcet winner, we
obtain the probability for a Condorcet paradox (no Condorcet winner exists)
as 1− 3 · Prob(n) with an exact limiting probability of 116 .
In a similar way we can determine probabilities for other voting events.
Condorcet efficiency of Plurality voting. If there is a Condorcet win-
ner, there is good reason to consider him to be the voter’s choice. However,
many common voting rules do not always choose the Condorcet winner even
if one exists. This is in particular the case for the widely used plurality vot-
ing, where the candidate with a majority of first preferences is elected.
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The condition that candidate a is a Condorcet winner but candidate b is
the plurality winner can be expressed by the two inequalities (3) and (4),
together with the two additional inequalities
nba + nbc > nab + nac(5)
nba + nbc > nca + ncb(6)
( b wins plurality over a )
( b wins plurality over c )
The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability
that a Condorcet winner is elected if one exists. As there are 3·2 possibilities
for choosing a Condorcet winner and another plurality winner, we obtain
Prob(n) =
6 · card{(nab, . . . , ncb) ∈ Z6≥0 satisfying (2), (3), (4), (5), (6)}
3 · card
{
(nab, . . . , ncb) ∈ Z6≥0 satisfying (2), (3), (4)
}
for the likelihood of a Condorcet winner being a plurality loser. Again,
depending on n being odd or even, one obtains polynomials in n in the
denominator and the numerator (see [Geh82]). The exact value of the limit
limn→∞Prob(n) is 16/135. Therefore, the Condorcet efficiency of plurality
voting with three candidates is 119/135 = 88.148%.
Plurality vs Plurality Runoff. Plurality Runoff voting is a common prac-
tice to overcome some of these “problems” of Plurality voting. It is used
in many presidential elections, for example in France. After a first round
of plurality voting in which none of the candidates has achieved more than
50% of the votes, the first two candidates compete in a second runoff round.
The condition that candidate b is the plurality winner, but candidate a
wins the second round of Plurality Runoff can be expressed by the two
inequalities (5) and
(7) nab + nac > nca + ncb, ( a wins plurality over c )
together with the linear condition (3) that a beats b in a pairwise compari-
son. The probability that another candidate is chosen in the second round
as the number of voters tends to infinity is known to be 71/576 = 12.32638%
(see [LLS08]).
Four and more candidates. Having m candidates we can set up simi-
lar linear systems in m! variables. For example, in an election with four
candidates a, b, c, d we use the 24-dimensional vector xt = (nabc, . . . , ndcb).
Here, indices are taken in lexicographical order. The condition that a is a
Condorcet winner is described by the three inequalities that imply a beats
b, a beats c and a beats d in a pairwise comparison. As linear systems with
24 variables become hard to grasp, it is convenient to use matrices for their
description. We are interested in all non-negative integral (column) vectors
x satisfying the matrix inequality Ax > 0 for the matrix A ∈ Z3×24 with
entries
(8)
1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
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3. Likelihood of voting situations and Ehrhart’s theory
Integral points in polyhedral cones. In order to deal with an arbitrary
number of candidates, let us put the example above in a slightly more general
context. In any of the three voting examples, the voting situations of interest
lie in a polyhedral cone, that is, in a set P of points in Rd (with d = 6 or
d = 24 in case of three or four candidate elections) satisfying a finite number
of homogeneous linear inequalities. In addition to the strict inequalities
which are different in each of the examples, the condition that the variables
ni are non-negative can be expressed by the homogeneous linear inequalities
ni ≥ 0.
Let P,S ⊂ Rd denote two d-dimensional polyhedral cones, each defined
by some homogeneous linear (possibly strict) inequalities. We may assume
that P is contained in S and that both polyhedral cones are contained in
the orthant Rd≥0. If we are interested in elections with n voters, we consider
the voting situations (integral vectors) in the intersection of P and S with
the affine subspace
Ldn =
{
(n1, . . . , nd) ∈ Rd |
d∑
i=1
ni = n
}
.
The expected frequency of voting situations being in P among voting situa-
tions in S is then expressed by
(9) Prob(n) =
card
(P ∩ Ldn ∩ Zd)
card (S ∩ Ldn ∩ Zd)
.
When estimating the probability of candidate a being a Condorcet winner
for instance, the homogeneous polyhedral cone S is simply the non-negative
orthant Rd≥0 described by the linear inequalities ni ≥ 0. In that case the
denominator is known to be equal to(
n+ d− 1
d− 1
)
.
This is a polynomial in n of degree d− 1 (the dimension of Ldn ∩ S).
Ehrhart theory. By Ehrhart’s theory, the number of integral solutions in a
polyhedral cone intersected with Ldn can be expressed by a quasi-polynomial
in n. Roughly speaking, a quasi-polynomial is simply a finite collection
p1(n), . . . , pk(n) of polynomials, such that the number of voting situations
is given by pi(n) if i ≡ n mod k.
The degree of the polynomial is equal to the dimension of the polyhedral
cone intersected with Ldn. In the voting events considered here this dimension
is always equal to d−1. So in the examples with three candidates their degree
is always 5. The number k of different polynomials depends on the linear
inequalities involved. For the Condorcet paradox we have k = 2 polynomials
p1(n) and p2(n), where p1(n) gives the answer for odd n (1 ≡ n mod 2)
and p2(n) gives the answer for even n (0 ≡ 2 ≡ n mod 2). For Condorcet
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efficiency we have k = 6 (see [Geh02]) and for Plurality vs Plurality Runoff
we have k = 12 (see [LLS08]).
Given a polyhedral cone P, the quasi-polynomial q(n) = card (P ∩ Ldn ∩ Zd)
can be explicitly computed using software packages like LattE integrale
[latte] or barvinok [barvinok]. The result for the polyhedral cone P de-
scribing candidate a as the Condorcet winner could look like
1/384 * n^5
+ ( 1/64 * { 1/2 * n } + 1/32 ) * n^4
+ ( 17/96 * { 1/2 * n } + 13/96 ) * n^3
+ ( 23/32 * { 1/2 * n } + 1/4 ) * n^2
+ ( 233/192 * { 1/2 * n } + 1/6 ) * n
+ ( 45/64 * { 1/2 * n } + 0 )
The curly brackets {· · · } mean the fractional part of the enclosed number,
allowing to write the quasi-polynomial in a closed form. In this example
we get different polynomials for odd and even n. Note that the leading
coefficient (the coefficient of n5) is in both cases the same. By Ehrhart’s
theory this is always the case, as it is equal to the relative volume of the
polyhedron P ∩ Ld1. That is, it is equal to a
√
d-multiple of the standard
Lebesgue measure on the affine space Ld1. The measure is normalized so that
the space contains one integral point per unit volume.
One technical obstacle using software like LattE integrale or barvinok
is the use of polyhedral cones described by a mixture of strict and non-strict
inequalities. As the software assumes the input to have only non-strict
inequalities or equality conditions, one has to avoid the use of strict inequal-
ities. A simple way to achieve this is the replacement of strict inequalities
x > 0 by non-strict ones x ≥ 1, in case x is known to be integral. For
instance, if x is a linear expression with integer coefficients, and if we are
interested in integral solutions as in our examples, this is a possible refor-
mulation.
Altogether, by obtaining quasi-polynomials for numerator and denomina-
tor in (9) we get an explicit formula for Prob(n) via Erhart’s theory.
Limiting probabilities via integration. If we want to compute the exact
value of limn→∞Prob(n) as n tends to infinity, we can use volume compu-
tations without using Ehrhart’s theory. As mentioned above, the leading
coefficients of denominator and numerator correspond to the relative vol-
umes of the sets P ∩ L1 and S ∩ L1:
lim
n→∞
Prob(n) = lim
n→∞
card
(P ∩ Ld1 ∩ (Z/n)d)
card
(S ∩ Ld1 ∩ (Z/n)d) =
relvol
(P ∩ Ld1)
relvol
(S ∩ Ld1)
In fact, as long as we use the same measure to evaluate the numera-
tor and the denominator, it does not matter what multiple of the standard
Lebesgue measure we use to compute volume on the affine space Ld1. The ex-
act relative volume can be computed using LattE integrale. Alternatives
are for example Normaliz (see [normaliz]) or vinci (see [BEF00]). Exact
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computations can be quite involved in higher dimensions (cf. [DF88]). In
such cases it is sometimes only possible to compute an approximation, using
Monte Carlo methods for instance.
4. Reducing the dimension by exploiting polyhedral symmetries
In many models the involved linear systems and polyhedra are quite sym-
metric. In particular, permutations of variables may lead to equivalent lin-
ear systems describing the same polyhedron. Such symmetries are often
visible in smaller examples and can automatically be determined for larger
problems, for instance by our software SymPol (see [RS10]). In the three
examples described in Section 2, we can exploit such symmetries to reduce
the complexity of computations.
Condorcet’s paradox. In case of a being a Condorcet winner in a three
candidate election, the variables nab and nac occur pairwise (as nac+nab) in
inequalities (3), (4) and in equation (2). The same is true for nbc and ncb.
By introducing new variables na = nac + nab and n∗a = nbc + ncb we can
reduce the dimension of the linear system to only four variables:
na + nca − n∗a − nba > 0
na + nba − n∗a − nca > 0
na + nca + n∗a + nba = n
na, n∗a, nba, nca ≥ 0.
The index a indicates that we group all variables which carry candidate a
as their first preference and index ∗a stands for grouping of all variables
with candidate a ranked last. In the reduced linear system each 4-tuple
(na, n∗a, nba, nca) represents several voting situations, previously described
by 6-tuples. For na we have (na + 1) different possibilities of non-negative
integral tuples (nac, nab). Similar is true for n∗a. Together we have
(na + 1)(n∗a + 1)
voting situations with three candidates represented by each non-negative
integral vector (na, n∗a, nba, nca).
In the four candidate case it is possible to obtain a similar reformulation
by grouping among 24 variables. We introduce a new variable for sets of
variables having same coefficients in the linear system. Having a matrix
representation as in (8), this kind of special symmetry in the linear system
is easy to find by identifying equal columns. Introducing a new variable for
each set of equal columns we get
(10)
na − nba + nca + nda + n∗ab − n∗ac − n∗ad − n∗a > 0
na + nba − nca + nda − n∗ab + n∗ac − n∗ad − n∗a > 0
na + nba + nca − nda − n∗ab − n∗ac + n∗ad − n∗a > 0
These three inequalities describe voting situations in which candidate a
beats candidates b, c and d each in a pairwise comparison. As in all of our
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examples, we additionally have the condition that the involved variables add
up to n and that all of them are non-negative.
As before, the used indices of variables reflect which voter preferences are
grouped. As in the three candidate case, na and n∗a denote the number
of voters with candidate a being their first and last preference respectively.
Similarly, xy and ∗yx in the index indicate that voters with preference order
starting with x, y and ending with y, x have been combined.
Using our software SymPol [sympol] one easily checks that the original
system with 24 variables has a symmetry group of order 199065600. The
new reduced system with 8 variables, obtained through the above grouping
of variables, turns out to have a symmetry group of order 6 only. So most of
the symmetry in the original system is of the simple form that is detectable
through equal columns in a matrix representation. The remaining 6-fold
symmetry comes from the possibility to arbitrarily permute the variables
nba, nca, nda when at the same time the variables n∗ab, n∗ac, n∗ad are per-
muted accordingly. This symmetry is due to the fact that candidates b, c
and d are equally treated in the linear system (10). The two new variables
na and n∗a each combine six of the former variables. The other six new
variables each combine two former ones.
Weighted counting. In general, if we group more than two variables, say
if we substitute the sum of k variables n1 + . . . + nk by a new variable N ,
we have to include a factor of (
N + k − 1
k − 1
)
when counting voting situations viaN . If we substitute d variables (n1, . . . , nd)
by D new variables (N1, . . . , ND), say by setting Ni to be the sum of ki of
the variables nj, for i = 1, . . . ,D, then we count for each D-tuple
(11) p(N1, . . . , ND) =
D∏
i=1
(
Ni + ki − 1
ki − 1
)
many voting situations.
In the example above, with four candidates and candidate a being the
Condorcet winner, we have d = 24, D = 8 and we obtain a degree 16
polynomial(
na + 5
5
)
(nba+1)(nca +1)(nda +1)(n∗ab+1)(n∗ac+1)(n∗ad +1)
(
n∗a + 5
5
)
to count voting situations for each 8-tuple
(na, nba, nca, nda, n∗ab, n∗ac, n∗ad, n∗a) .
Geometrically, the polyhedral cone P ⊂ Rd is replaced by a new polyhe-
dral cone P ′ ⊂ RD in a lower dimension. As the counting is changed we
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obtain for the probability (9) of voting situations in P among those in S:
(12) Prob(n) =
∑
x∈P∩Ldn∩Z
d
1
∑
x∈S∩Ldn∩Z
d
1
=
∑
y∈P ′∩LDn ∩Z
D
p(y)
∑
y∈S′∩LDn ∩Z
D
p(y)
.
Here, S ′ is equal to the corresponding homogeneous polyhedral cone ob-
tained from S ⊂ Rd, and p(y) is the polynomial (11) in D variables. In the
example of Condorcet’s paradox, S ′ is simply equal to the full orthant RD≥0.
As seen in Section 3, we can use Ehrhart’s theory to determine an ex-
plicit formula for Prob(n). The right hand side of the formula above sug-
gests that we can do this also via weighted lattice point counting in dimen-
sion D. A corresponding Ehrhart-type theory has recently been considered
(see [BBL+10]). A first implementation is available in the package barvinok
via the command barvinok summate. We successfully tested the software
on some reformulations of three candidate elections, but so far barvinok
seems not capable to do computations for the four candidate case. However,
there still seems quite some improvement possible in the current implemen-
tation (personal communication with Sven Verdoolaege). It is expected that
future versions of LattE integrale will be capable of these computations
(personal communication with Matthias Ko¨ppe).
Limiting probabilities via integration. If we want to compute the exact
value of limn→∞ Prob(n) we may use integration. Using (12) we get through
substitution of y = nz:
lim
n→∞
Prob(n) = lim
n→∞
∑
y∈P ′∩LDn ∩Z
D
p(y)
∑
y∈S′∩LDn ∩Z
D
p(y)
= lim
n→∞
∑
z∈P ′∩LD
1
∩(Z/n)D
p(nz)
∑
z∈S′∩LD
1
∩(Z/n)D
p(nz)
= lim
n→∞
∑
z∈P ′∩LD
1
∩(Z/n)D
p(nz)/ndeg p
∑
z∈S′∩LD
1
∩(Z/n)D
p(nz)/ndeg p
=
∫
P ′∩LD
1
lt(z) dz∫
S′∩LD
1
lt(z) dz
.
Here, the division of numerator and denominator by a degree of p (deg p)
power of n shows that the integrals on the right are taken over the lead-
ing term lt(z) of the polynomial p(z) only. Thus determining the exact
limiting probability is achieved by integrating a degree d − D monomial
over a bounded polyhedron (polytope) in the (D − 1)-dimensional affine
space LD1 . We refer to [LDK
+11b] for background on efficient integration
methods (cf. [BBL+11] and [Sch98]).
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As in the case of relative volume computations in dimension d, the integral
is taken with respect to the relative Lebesgue measure – here on the affine
space LD1 . In fact, as we are computing a quotient, any measure being a
multiple of the standard Lebesgue measure on LD1 will give the same value.
For the example with candidate a being a Condorcet winner in a four
candidate election, the leading term to be integrated is
n5a · nba · nca · nda · n∗ab · n∗ac · n∗ad · n5∗a,
which is much simpler than the full polynomial. Integrating this polyno-
mial over the reduced 8-dimensional polyhedron can be done using LattE
integrale (called with option valuation=integrate). In this way one
obtains in a few seconds an exact value of 1717/2048 for the probability
that a Condorcet winner exists (as n tends to infinity). This value cor-
responds to the one obtained by Gehrlein in [Geh01] and serves as a test
case for our method. The corresponding volume computation with LattE
integrale (called with option valuation=volume) in 24 variables did not
finish after several weeks of computation. Bogdan Ichim reports (November
2011) that this volume computation is doable with his software Normaliz
(see [normaliz]). Nevertheless, the volume computation is much slower than
the corresponding integration over the 8-dimensional polyhedron.
In a similar way we can deal with other voting situations as well.
Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting. Assuming candidate a is a
Condorcet winner, but candidate b wins a plurality voting, we obtain a
reduced system in the three candidate case with five variables:
na − nba − nbc − ncb + nca > 0
na + nba − nbc − ncb − nca > 0
−na + nba + nbc > 0
nba + nbc − ncb − nca > 0
Here the only reduction is the grouping na = nab+nac. The corresponding
polynomial weight is na + 1.
The four candidate case is more involved. The linear system with 24 vari-
ables has a comparatively small symmetry group of order 92160. We can
group six variables into na. Taking the reduced system (10) of three inequal-
ities with 8 variables (modeling that candidate a is a Condorcet winner) we
have to add three inequalities for the condition that candidate b wins plu-
rality. These can be shortly described by nb > na, nc, nd, but a grouping of
variables in nb, nc and nd is incompatible with the other three conditions.
Instead we use new variables nb∗a, nc∗a and nd∗a (in (10) combined in n∗a)
for preferences in which a is ranked last. Additionally we have to keep the
variables where candidate a is ranked third (in (10) combined in n∗ab, n∗ac,
n∗ad).
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In the three inequalities (10) we can simply substitute n∗a by nb∗a+nc∗a+
nd∗a and n∗ad, n∗ac and n∗ab by nbca+ncba, nbda+ndba and ncda+ndca. The
additional three linear inequalities for candidate b being a plurality winner
are then:
nb∗a + nba + nbca + nbda − na > 0
nb∗a + nba + nbca + nbda − nc∗a − nca − ncba − ncda > 0
nb∗a + nba + nbca + nbda − nd∗a − nda − ndba − ndca > 0
This reduced linear system has 6 inequalities for 13 variables. It still has
a symmetry of order 2 coming from an interchangeable role of candidates c
and d. The degree 11 polynomial used for integration is
n5a · nba · nca · nda · nb∗a · nc∗a · nd∗a.
With it, using LattE integrale, we obtain an exact limit of
10658098255011916449318509
14352135440302080000000000
= 74.261410 . . .%
for the Condorcet efficiency of plurality voting with four candidates. To the
best of our knowledge this value has not been computed before.
Plurality vs Plurality Runoff. The case of Plurality vs Plurality Runoff
has a high degree of symmetry. For three candidates we obtain a reduced
four dimensional reformulation:
nb − na > 0
na − nca − ncb > 0
na + nca − nb − ncb > 0
Counting is done via the polynomial weight (na +1)(nb +1). Integration
of nanb over the corresponding 3-dimensional polyhedron yields the known
limiting probability.
If we consider elections with m candidates, m ≥ 4, we can set up a linear
system with only 2(m − 1) variables and m inequalities. We denote the
candidates by a, b and ci for i = 1, . . . ,m− 2:
nb − na > 0
For i = 1, . . . ,m− 2 : na − nci·a·b − nci·b·a > 0
na +
m−2∑
i=1
nci·a·b − nb −
m−2∑
i=1
nci·b·a > 0
The first two lines model that candidate b wins plurality over candidate a
and that candidate a is second, winning over candidates ci, for i = 1, . . . ,m−
2. The last inequality models the condition that candidate a beats b in a
pairwise comparison. The variable nci·a·b gives the number of voters with
candidate ci being their first preference and candidate a being ranked before
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candidate b. Similarly, nci·b·a is the number of voters with first preference ci
and candidate b being ranked before candidate a. We use “·” to denote any
ordering of candidates; in contrast to “∗” used before we also allow an empty
list here. For both variables, nci·a·b and nci·b·a, we group (m−1)!/2 of the m!
former variables. The new variables na and nb both represent (m−1)! former
variables. Therefore, counting is adapted using the polynomial weight
(na · nb)(m−1)!−1 ·
m−2∏
i=1
(nci·a·b · nci·b·a)(m−1)!/2−1
of degree m!− 2m+ 2.
The above inequalities assume that candidates b and a are ranked first
and second in a plurality voting. So having the probability for the corre-
sponding voting situations, we have to multiply by m(m − 1) to get the
overall probability of a plurality winner losing in a second Plurality Runoff
round.
For four candidates (m = 4) we obtain an exact limiting probability of
2988379676768359
12173449145352192
= 24.548339 . . .%.
This result can be obtained using the weighted, dimension-reduced prob-
lem with LattE integrale, as well as by a relative volume computation
in 24 variables. However, the latter is a few hundred times slower than in-
tegration over the dimension reduced polyhedron. A similar result from a
volume computation is obtained in [LDK+11b].
To be certain about our new results, we computed the value above, as
well as the likelihood for the existence of a Condorcet winner, with a fully
independent Maple calculation, using the package Convex (see [convex]).
For it, we first obtained a triangulation (non-overlapping union of simplices)
of the dimension-reduced polyhedron and then applied symbolic integration
to each simplex.
We also tried to solve the five candidate case, where the polyhedron is
only 7-dimensional (in 8 variables). The integration of a polynomial of
degree 112, however, seems a bit too difficult for the currently available
technology. Nevertheless it seems that we are close to obtain exact five
candidate results as well.
5. Conclusions
Using symmetry of linear systems we can obtain symmetry reduced lower
dimensional reformulations. These allow to compute exact limiting proba-
bilities for large elections with four candidates. In this work we only gave
a few starting examples. Similar calculations are possible for many other
voting situations as well.
For the lower-dimensional weighted lattice point problems, efficient math-
ematical software for the computation of Ehrhart quasi-polynomials will
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soon be available. We anticipate that it will allow to obtain explicit for-
mulas for the probability of certain voting outcomes with four candidates
and any number of voters. Such formulas will most likely be quite huge and
hardly usable without computer assistance.
For elections with five or more candidates further ideas seem necessary.
One possibility to reduce the complexity of computations further is the use
of additional symmetries which remain in our reduced systems.
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